Messages conveyed to the international community, particularly Western powers, by Iran's newly elected President, Masoud Pezeshkian, through two articles penned in July 2024, were unequivocal. Pezeshkian exhibited confidence and a willingness to cooperate with European nations on various political, economic, and security matters. However, his stance noticeably shifted when addressing Iran's relations with the United States, despite the measured approach taken by the current US administration under President Joe Biden, which stood in stark contrast to the policies of his predecessor, Donald Trump.
Pezeshkian's perspectives are likely to play a pivotal role in shaping Iran's relations with the West over the next four years, barring any unforeseen developments in Tehran or the broader region. As reformists ascend to power in Iran, the United States is gearing up for its 60th presidential election. The Republican candidate and former president, Donald Trump, will face off against the prospective Democratic nominee, Vice President Kamala Harris. Harris announced her candidacy following Joe Biden's withdrawal from the race on July 22, 2024, due to health concerns that prompted numerous Democrats to urge him to step aside.
Given Trump's contentious legacy and Biden's recent engagements with Tehran on several issues, most notably Iran's controversial nuclear program, this election cycle in Washington is of paramount interest to politicians and stakeholders in Tehran. The outcome will significantly influence US policy towards Iran on various contentious issues and, consequently, impact the Iranian economy, public satisfaction with the government, and political stability in Tehran in the coming period.
In light of these developments, this article aims to explore the potential future scenarios of Iranian-American relations based on the possible outcomes of the US presidential election.
Divergent Views
Iran is closely monitoring the preparations for the upcoming US presidential election in November 2024. The internal Iranian perspective on this pivotal event can be summarized as follows:
1. Fear of Trump's victory:
Generally, Iranians view the prospect of a Republican victory, particularly Trump's, with apprehension. This is primarily due to Trump's historically tougher and more stringent policy towards Tehran, known as "maximum pressure." Trump stands as one of the staunchest opponents of the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran, which was reached in Lausanne, Switzerland. As president, he withdrew from the deal in May 2018. Furthermore, Trump has consistently opposed Iran's nuclear and missile projects, its regional influence, and foreign policy, taking strict measures against these areas.
These Iranian concerns have been further intensified by Trump's recent announcement of Ohio Senator James David Vance as his campaign's vice-presidential candidate. Vance, who aligns with Trump's hardline stance towards Tehran, has been vocal in his criticism of the 2015 nuclear deal. In a tweet on "X" (formerly Twitter) on April 25, 2022, Vance described it as the "disastrous Obama Iran deal," praising Trump's decision to withdraw from it as "one of the former President Trump's best foreign policy decisions." He emphasized the need to "fight Biden hard on this."
Such statements suggest a high likelihood of Washington returning to the "maximum pressure" policy on Iran should Trump secure victory in the race to the White House.
2. Aspiration for a Democratic administration:
In contrast, the prospect of a Democratic administration, whether led by Harris or another Democrat, is viewed more favorably by Iran. A Democratic president is expected to adopt a noticeably less stringent approach towards Iran, although this stance has drawn criticism from many policymakers in Washington, including some Democrats, who have accused the Biden administration of being too lenient.
From Iran's perspective, the election of a Democratic president may represent an opportunity, albeit an incomplete one. It is unlikely that a Democratic US administration would pursue a maximum pressure policy on Iran, given the party's preference for negotiation to resolve the nuclear crisis. The Democrats have consistently advocated for resuming related negotiations aimed at reaching a nuclear agreement that prevents Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. This approach would likely prompt a potential Democratic administration to avoid imposing harsh sanctions on Tehran and might even encourage some political accommodations.
Moreover, a Democratic administration is less likely to adopt a strict policy concerning Iran's regional influence and policies in the Middle East. This makes a Democratic successor to Biden more acceptable to Iran.
Potential Scenarios
The future of Iranian-American relations after the upcoming US presidential election in November presents two potential directions, particularly if Trump wins:
A. If Trump Wins
A potential second presidential term for Trump in Washington is expected to continue, and possibly intensify, the policies of his first term towards Tehran (2017-2021). Recent developments within Iran and the complexities of Iranian-American relations may drive Trump to adopt even stricter measures, leading to the following predictions:
1- Reduced likelihood of a nuclear agreement:
Despite three and a half years of public and secret nuclear negotiations conducted by the Biden administration, significant progress towards a nuclear agreement with Iran has not been achieved, nor has Iran's nuclear activities been halted. Iran continues to advance its nuclear program, with many American and Western reports now acknowledging Iran as a "nuclear threshold state" during Biden's tenure.
Given these developments and Trump's rejection of the 2015 nuclear deal (referred to by Iranians as "Burjam"), a potential second Trump administration might take extremely stringent measures against Iran's nuclear program. This would likely begin with imposing severe sanctions on Tehran and significantly tightening the economic blockade, reminiscent of the "maximum pressure" Act.
Trump is expected to seriously threaten Iran with military or intelligence action against its nuclear program, potentially in cooperation with Israel and its foreign intelligence agency, Mossad. This could include assassinating prominent Iranian nuclear scientists and launching cyber attacks on the country's nuclear facilities.
However, given the increasing Israeli and American concerns regarding Iran's nuclear advancements during Biden's Democratic administration, and considering the possibility of consensus on Iran between Trump and some European governments (especially with the rise of right-wing and populist factions), the option of "limited" military action against Iran's nuclear program becomes plausible. This is particularly likely if coupled with Israel's desire for action, as evidenced by Israel's recent precision strike on Iran's Eighth Shekari Air Base near the Natanz nuclear facility, one of Iran's most important sites for uranium enrichment.
Nevertheless, a large-scale military attack against Iran or its nuclear facilities remains unlikely, as it could ignite a broader regional or international conflict involving Russia and China. The international community cannot bear such repercussions, especially considering the potential retaliation from dozens of Iranian proxy groups against Israel and Western interests.
Consequently, it is highly improbable that a nuclear agreement between Iran and major powers will be reached during a potential second Trump term. A Trump-led U.S. administration would likely neither accept nor commit to a nuclear agreement limited only to Iran and European powers.
2- Curbing Iran's regional influence:
Alongside combating Iran's nuclear activities, a potential second Trump administration would likely seek to curtail Iran's regional influence. This could involve attacking the Houthis over their ongoing threats to navigation and trade in the Red Sea, or targeting pro-Iranian militias in Syria and Iraq in response to their attacks against American bases and troops.
Moreover, compared to the Biden administration, a second Trump term would likely see increased support for Israel in its conflicts with Palestinian factions in Gaza, clashes with Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, and confrontations with the Houthis in Yemen. Trump might even give Israel greater latitude and full support to launch open battles against Iran's proxies in the region.
3- Targeting Iran's missile and drone programs:
Restricting Iran's missile capabilities and drone industry would likely be a significant goal for a potential second Trump administration. To impede their development, Trump is expected to impose stringent sanctions on Iran's missile and drone manufacturing sectors and on exports of materials used in their production. Furthermore, Trump may consider swift military strikes against relevant military manufacturing sites within Iran, either by American forces or by giving Israel the green light to carry out such missions.
4- Prioritizing economic sanctions:
Trump is highly likely to effectively utilize economic sanctions against Iran as a means to threaten and punish Tehran, attempting to force it to accept his directives regarding its nuclear and missile programs, as well as its regional influence. Notably, while the Biden administration has continued to impose sanctions on Iran, it has been less vigilant in addressing Iran's attempts to circumvent these sanctions, as hinted by former Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif during Iran's presidential race.
B. If A Democratic Candidate Wins the Race
Should a Democratic candidate emerge victorious in the November 2024 US presidential election, their approach towards Iran is likely to align closely with the current Biden administration's policies. Both would represent the Democratic Party, which has historically followed a specific path when dealing with Iranian affairs. The main scenarios for Iranian-American relations under a potential Democratic administration can be outlined as follows:
1. Reaching a new nuclear agreement with Iran (JCPOA 2.0):
A potential Democratic administration will likely prioritize resuming nuclear talks with Iran, which have been stalled since September 2022. The Biden administration's focus on the upcoming presidential election has temporarily sidelined these negotiations. However, should another Democratic candidate win, they are expected to return to the negotiating table in Vienna and work towards a new nuclear agreement with Tehran.
The prospects of reaching such an agreement are further enhanced by the recent victory of reformists in Iran's presidential election. Masoud Pezeshkian, the newly sworn-in president, represents a faction generally more open to rapprochement with the West. Despite criticizing Western non-compliance with the 2015 nuclear agreement, Pezeshkian has repeatedly expressed willingness to resume nuclear negotiations. This sentiment is echoed by other Iranian officials, as evidenced by Deputy Foreign Minister for Legal and International Affairs Reza Najafi's statement on July 22, 2024, reaffirming Iran's readiness to return to the negotiating table.
2. Iran's continued regional influence expansion:
Given Biden's tendency towards a more conciliatory approach with Tehran, Iran might continue to expand its influence in the Middle East during a potential Democratic presidency. This scenario is reinforced by the likely efforts of a Democratic president to appease Iran in pursuit of a second nuclear agreement. Such an agreement would implicitly suggest that military actions against Iran in the region would be limited, except in cases where its proxies directly threaten American and Western interests.
It is worth noting that Iran's regional expansion gained significant momentum following the 2015 nuclear agreement, reached during the second term of former Democratic President Barack Obama (2013-2017).
3. Ongoing development of Iran's missile and drone programs:
Despite initial attempts by the Biden administration to include Iran's missile and drone programs in negotiations, these conditions were later abandoned due to Iran's insistence on excluding them from talks. In recent years, Iran has continued to develop various types of missiles and drones, leading to increased Western accusations of Tehran supplying these weapons to Moscow and indications of increased production.
A potential Democratic administration, aiming to avoid conflict with Iran, especially if a nuclear agreement is reached, is likely to refrain from taking escalatory steps against Tehran over its missile and drone programs. This approach would effectively allow Iran to continue developing these capabilities.
4. De-prioritization of economic sanctions:
If a nuclear agreement is reached between Iran and major powers during a second Democratic administration, the emphasis on economic sanctions against Iran is likely to diminish. Such an agreement would signify a thawing of relations between Iran and the West, potentially leading to the easing of some current sanctions and a reluctance to impose new ones. Even without a new nuclear deal, a Democratic administration might allow Iran some flexibility to mitigate the impact of sanctions, similar to the current situation regarding Iran's oil exports or agreements with various countries that face limited restrictions from Washington.
In conclusion, a potential second Trump administration's approach towards Tehran would likely be more stringent than during his first term, contrasting sharply with a potential second consecutive Democratic administration. Whether led by Kamala Harris or another Democrat, the latter is expected to adopt a less stringent stance with Tehran, potentially leading to an expansion of Iran's nuclear, missile, and regional ambitions.
However, the Israeli factor should not be overlooked in future scenarios of US-Iran relations. Israel continuously pressures the U.S. Administration, regardless of whether it is led by Republicans or Democrats, to adopt stricter policies towards Tehran. Simultaneously, Iran's regional movements concerning complex Middle Eastern issues play a crucial role in either escalating or de-escalating tensions between Washington and the Iranian government.
In summary, while a potential second Trump administration would likely pursue a more hardline approach, a second Democratic administration would probably be more lenient. This disparity in approaches could result in varying degrees of expansion in Iran's nuclear, missile, and regional ambitions.
